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Introduction 
The Emerging Salience of Geoengineering 
Wil C. G. Bums and Andrew L. Strauss 
What has become increas ingly clear over t·he last few years is that the international 
communi ty is not even close to t<lckling t·he global warming problem in a way that 
will avert prof~und climatic consequences. Paragraph 1 of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord formally incorporates "the scientific view that the increase in global tempera-
ture shou ld be below two degrees Celsius.'" In fact, that scientific view is changing as 
more and more cl imate researchers come to realize that a two degrees Celsius increase 
over preindustrial levels threa tens serious disruptions of the ea rth 's biosphere. 
T he current inc rease in global temperatures of .8 degrees Celsius is already hav-
ing a significant deleterious effec t. G laciers are melting,' sea levels are rising,3 a 
third of Arctic sea ice is disappearing in th e summer,4 the oceans are 30 percent 
more acidic,; and the average moisture cont·ent of th e earth's air has increased by 5 
percen t, lead ing to more extreme weather.6 Prominent NASA scientist Jim Hansen 
echoed the views of many climatologists when he declared, "warming [of two 
degrees Celsius] is a guarantee of global disasters."7 
Copenhagen Accord, art. I, Dec. 18,2009, available at ht~):llunfccc. int/lil es/meetings/copI 5/applica­
tion/pdf/copl5cphauv.pclf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001' The Physical Science /3asis: Contribution of Working Croup I to the 1'(J!lrth 
/\ssessl11ent Report of the Intergovern lllenl<Ji Panel Oil Clilllate Challge 109 (Z. Manning et <II. eds., 
2007). 
1 Id. at III ; CLIMATE CHANGE & SEA LEVEL RISE: CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE OCEANS, 
C limate Institute, ht~):llwww.clim ate.o rg/topics/se.l - l evel/index. html(l as t visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
4 ARCTIC REPORT CARD: UPDATE FOR 20 11 , TRACKING RECENT ENVIRONM ENTAL CHANGES, SEA ICE 
(D. Perovich et al. eds., 2011), available at ht~:llwww.arc ti c. n oaa.gov/reportca rd/sea_ i ce.html(las t 
visited Aug. 7,2012). 
ROYAL SOCIETY, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASlNG ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE: POLI CY 
DOCUMENT 12105 25-30 (J . Raven et al. eds., 2005), available at http://roY<l lsociety.org/uploadedFiles/ 
RoyaLSociety_Content/policy/public<l ti ons/z005/9634·tJClf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
6 CLI MATE CHANGE 2007, SUIJ((1 note 2, <It 105. 
7 Interview by World Watch Institute with James t-hill sen, 21 WORLD WATC H MAG. 6, Oldy/Aug. 2008), 
available at ht~:llwww.lVorld w<l tc h .org/nod e/5775. 
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But even the prospects of keeping global warming within the two dcgrees threshold 
seem ex tremely unlikely from today's va ntage point. The best sc ientific estimates are 
that we can collec tively release roughly 565 more giga tons of ca rbon int·o the atmo-
sphere by midcentury and stay within the two degrees Celsius threshold ; however 
at current growth rates of approximately 3 percent· per yea r (which show no signs of 
aba ting) we are on track to considerably exceed t-ilat thresholclB Despite consic1 er-
clble sc ientific consensus about the dangers we are facing, and a well-funded climate 
change movement t'hat has ga lvanized citi zens from aroundt'he world , on balance 
the politica l will to make the necessa ry effort to reduce carbon emiss ions does not 
exist. What is more, it does not seem likely to come about within t'he time fram e 
necessary to stave off very serious consequences. 
With this political rea lity in the foreground, we asked eleven of the world 's most 
prominent students of climate change law and policy to contribute to this book on 
"the deliberate large-sca le manipulation of the planetary environment to counter-
act anthropogenic climate change,"9 commonly ca ll ed geoengineering or climate 
modification. Although the prospect of global acto rs embarking upon major clilllate 
modification projects in the hope of countering climat'e change terrifi es sO llle and 
excites others, few doubt that it could well be in our collec t ive fut·ure. As long as 
t'he threa t of climate change continues to grow and geoengineering tec hnologies 
are within reach , th e t'antali zing hope of a geoengineering "fi x" will only grow more 
attractive to many. 
Th is cons idera hon of la rge-sca Ie geoengineering projects ra ises many serious 
legal, policy, and philosophical issues that are explored in the pages t'hat follow. We 
did not intend this volume to be an advocacy book to either promote or disc redit 
geoengineering as a response to climate change. Rather, in t'he hopes of helping 
inform t'he c1ebat'e that is emerging, we invited contributors with a wide range of 
perspec tives. At the most general level the questions break down into two broad 
categories: how do we decide and who decides. [s a decision to elllbark upon a 
lmge-scale and potentially risky project t·o modify the global clilllate ever justifi ed? 
If so, in a world that lacks a global legislature capable of making collective climate 
modification decisions, who should determine whether t·o authorize potentially ri sky 
projects? To th e ex tent states or priva te actors undertake such ventures without t'he 
bless ings of the international community generally, what rights do those who oppose 
such actions have? Although the methodologies used by our contributors are di ve rse, 
and there is considerable overlap in their approaches, genera lly spea king, t'he first 
x P. Fri edlingstein, R.A. iloughton, C. Marh1l1e1 , J Hackler, T.A. Boelen, T.J. Conway, J.C. Canaelcll , 
M.R. Raupach, P. Ciais & C. Le Quere, U{Jd(/le Oil C02 ";lIIis., iol).', 3 NATURE GEOSC IENCE 811 
(Dec. 2010). 
<, The Roy" I Society, Ceoellgilleerillg Ihe C/im(/te: Sciellce, Covenulllce (/Ild Uncertainl ), (Sept. 2009), 
at II , ht~):l/roya l soci ety.org/Ceoe llgin ee rillg-the-cli111atel (last visited on Mar. 28, 20 11 ). 
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three contributors to this volume ground their chapters in ethics and philosophy 
whereas the remaining contributors ground theirs in law and governance. We have, 
therefore , chosen to organize the volume along those lines. 
In Chapter 1, "Geoengineeringand Moral Schizophrenia : What Is the Question? ," 
Stephen M. Garcliner contends that two questions are central to the eth ics of geoen-
gineering. The justificatory question asks: "Under what future conditions might 
geoengineering become justified?" The nature of the future conditions he consid-
ers include, for example, the nature ancl extent of the climate change threat to be 
confronted, and other background global circumstances, including the existing 
governance mechanisms, individual protections, and compensation provisions. The 
contextual question ask: "What is the ethical context of the push toward geoen-
gineering, and what are its implications?" Gardiner argues that early discussions 
of geoengineering often marginalized both questions because participants in those 
discussions tended to view their consideration as luxuries that we could not afford 
given the emergency nature of the climate change problem. Gardiner concludes that 
such emergency arguments are ethically shortsighted, and morally schizophrenic . 
In reaching this conclusion, Gardiner employs two abstract examples. Although 
both are extreme and idealized, according to Gardiner even the imperfect analo-
gies provide reasons for concern about our current predicament. Ethically serious 
discussion of geoengineering should confront eth ical problems, rather than hide 
behind overly simplistic appeals to moral emergency. As Michael Stocker puts it in 
his seminal discussion of moral schizophrenia, "to refuse to do so bespeaks a malady 
of the spirit." 
In Chapter 2 , "The Ethical Foundations of Climate Engineering," Clive Hamilton 
argues that the idea that the planet's optimal temperature should be set through a 
process of calculation reflects a particular conception of the world and the nature of 
humans that emerged first with the Scientific Revolution and later Enlightenment 
philosophy. This conception, according to Hamilton, holds that the human being 
is a self-legislating sub jective entity, distinct from the rest of the world and guided 
by its cognitive abilities. It is, says Hamilton, the basis of the technological thinking 
now being applied in plans to engineer the climate. Hamilton suggests that solar 
radiation management is the culmination of the transition to the mechanical con-
ception of nature and the parallel emergence of ph ilosophies built on the idea of the 
autonomous rational subject exercising control over an inert environment. These 
conceptions, and the consequentialist ethics they gave rise to, are now challenged 
by earth-system science itself. The earth under the Anthropocene is not mere putty 
to be shaped at will by humans. 
In Chapter 3, "The Psychological Costs of Geoengineering: Why It May Be Hard 
to Accept even ifIt Works," Gareth Davies observes that debates about climate change 
and geoengineering often revolve around "quantitative and concrete cons iderations ," 
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such as economic and environmental impacts. Such considerations, however, he 
argues "are often quite di vorced from their rea l psychologica l imporlance for most 
people, the fear, uncerta inty, and hope that they may inspire." Davies suggests that 
an assessment of the psyc hological "losses" associated with climate geoengineering 
may explain far more than economic , climatic, or material factors about the basis 
of the opposition to geoengineering. The prim<uy l'11ree losses, Davies argue, are: 
re lative status, sec urity, and hope. Davies suggests I-hat many mcmbers of the envi-
ronmentalmovement would suffer a diminution of relative status if their mora l and 
political standing was undercut by a solution that did not require fundamentally 
transforming society. In te rms of securily, geoengineering could undermine securi ty 
by offering only partial solutions "between mitigation and c limate management" 
ancl "entail a probabilisl'ic approach to policy" that many wou ld find disconcert-
ing. Fina lly, if geoengineering were to remove climate change as a threat, Davies 
conl'ends that the hope of deep ecologists that climate change would justify their 
fundamental tenets wou ld be dashed. 
In Chapter 4, "Geoeng ineering and Cl imate Managemenl: From Ma rginali ty 
to Inevitabilily," Jay Michaelson makes the case that geoengineering, or climate 
management as he calls it, " is I·he only approach to climate change that can act as 
a compromise be tween libera ls and libertarians, greens and browns." It appea ls to 
conservatives, he argues, beca use it protects economic interests, is in line with mar-
ket ideology, uses technology rather than restraints on behavior, and avoids govern-
ment regulation. He argues that to liberals, its appeal may not be intuitive, but that 
their acceptance of it is necessa ry if they wish to actually make progress on climale 
change, given real world political realities. Michaelson acknowledges that liber-
als have legitimate concerns about embarking on climate managem ent initiatives. 
Those concerns range from equitable considerations, including the giving of "free 
passes" to polluters, to the potential risks and costs of projects, including cataclysmic 
warm ing in the case of cessation of solar radiation management and the dangers that 
rogue actors could pose. He argues, however, that these concerns are answerable in 
every case. 
In C hapter 5, "Climate Change and the Anthropocene Era," Lee Lime advo-
cates assess ing the judiciousness of climate geoengineering through the lens of a 
Weberian "ethic of responsibility." He focuses "on knowing the likely consequences 
of our policy choices and accepl'ing responsibility for them rather than on more 
abstract ethical precepts." Lane argues that greenhouse gas control measures would 
yield minimal nel' financial gains and impose ex tremely high costs; moreover, such 
controls could upset existing trade regimes, depress agricultura l production, and roil 
bilateral relationships belween major sta tes, including the Unit'ed Sta tes and C hina. 
Lane also argues that I·here are many imposing politica l barrie rs to effecbve imple-
menhltion of inl'ernational greenhouse gas controls. T he case for geoengineering 
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lies in the fact that the potential benefits are "very large compared to the estimated 
costs of developing and deploying it." Although Lane acknowledges risk associated 
with deployment, including potential shutdown of monsoons in Asia, he argues that 
the benefi ts would still substantially outweigh such costs, especially if such costs are 
weighed aga inst the impacts of climate change under a business-as-usual scenari o. 
Finall y, Lane outlines a way forward for developing a regime to govern climate 
geoengineering, suggesting that regime structure will be dependent "on both the 
distribution of relative power as well as the need to hold down the transaction costs 
of managing the ys tem ." 
In C hapter 6, "Political Legitimacy in Decisions about Experiments in Solar 
Radiation Management," David Morrow, Robert Kopp, and Michael Oppenheimer 
maintain that making good policy dec isions about solar radiation management 
(SRM) requ ires a better understanding than we currently have of the effectiveness 
and side effects of various SRM technologies. The authors argue, however, that gain-
ing such understanding would require multiyear global trial s. Observing that such 
trials would be ethically problematic beca use they would expose persons, animals, 
and ecosystems to serious risks, the authors go on to explore under what conditions 
such trials would be ethically acceptable . They conclude that such acceptability 
depends upon approval of the trials by an appropriate international body (i. e., one 
with the political legi timacy to authorize the trial). The authors endorse Buchanan 
and Keohane's "Complex Standard" for global political legitimacy: a global politi-
ca l institution is legitimate if it enjoys widespread support from democratic tates; 
meets certain substantive conditions, such as avoidance of serious injustices and 
the production of better outcomes than feas ible alterna tive institutions; and has 
certain epistemic virtues, such as transparency and accountability. Morrow, Kopp 
and Oppenheimer survey several global institutions as poss ible analogs for an SRM 
governance institution , including those for governing nuclea r weapons and for man-
aging the Antarctic environment. 
In C hapter 7, "Geoengineering and the Myth of Unilateralism: Pressures and 
Prospect·s for International Cooperation," Josh ua Horton addresses one of the pri-
mary concerns of geoengineering opponents (as well as some proponents): the 
specter of unilateral deployment. Horton argues that unilateral deployment is 
unlikely for severa l reasons. To begin with, a state that chooses to unilaterally deploy 
a geoengineering option would face the possibility of deployment of the same or 
other geoengineering options by other states, potentially impairing the effecti veness 
of this approach . This would , Horton argues, necessitate coordination of deploy-
ment with other actors. Moreover, in the case of SRM, the so-called termination 
problem (the potential for a huge spike in warming should solar de Aection once 
embarked upon be terminated ; see Burns, C hapter 9, infra) would encourage sta tes 
reluctant to make an indefinite commitment on their own to coordinate their efforts 
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int-ernationally. Finally, Horton contends that the ava ilability of countermeasures 
"would serve as perhaps the most pot-ent check on unilateral deployment of geoen-
gineering technologies such as stratospheric aerosol injections." Horton also main-
tains that multilateral ism in geoengineering research and potential deployment can 
be fostered by a portfolio of tactics known as "international management theory." 
In Chapter 8, "International Legal Regimes and Principles Relevant to 
Geoengineering," Albert Lin assesses the potential role of international law in 
governing potential research and development and deployment of geoengineer-
ing options. Although concluding that no international agreement directly regu-
lat-es geoengineering, Lin argues that a number of relevant treaties and principles 
of international law may playa role in geoengineering governance. Lin init ially 
di scusses a seri es of trea ties that may extend to geoengineering options in a gen-
eral sense, including th e United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques, and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Lin then turns to "media-specific" treaties that may apply only to par-
ticular types of geoengineering projects, such as the London Convention/London 
Protocol, and the Law of the Sea Convention (ocean iron ferti li zation (OIF)); t-h e 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Ai r Pollution; the Montreal Prot-ocol 
(SRM options injec ting particles into the atmosphere), and the Outer Space Treaty 
(space-based options) . Finally, Lin suggests that there are several international norms 
that might be appos ite, including norms calling for transboundary environmental 
impact assessment, and the prohibition on inAicting transboundary harm, as well as 
norms with less certain applica tion , including the precautionary principle and the 
principle of in tergenera t-ional equity. 
In Chapter 9, "Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management and its 
Implications for lntergenerational Equity," this book's coeditor, William Burns, exam-
ines the extent to which the emerging global norms requ iring that our presen t-day 
ac tions take into account intergenerational equity legally constrain SRM geoengi-
neering options. Burns contends that ceasing the use of SRM technologies would 
pose the threat of a "termination effect," a huge multi-decadal pulse of warming 
that- could overwhelm many ecosystems and human institutions. Moreover, some 
SRM approaches could delay replenishment of the stratospheric ozone layer by as 
much as seventy years. Such long-term deleterious consequences, the author argues, 
would violate the principle of intergenerational equity by potentially denying future 
generations an environment of commensurate quali ty to that we curren tly enjoy 
because of either tec hnological failure or societal choice. Moreover, the threat of 
a termination effect might compel future generations to continue the use of SRM 
technologies, even if they deemed these technologies to be Illorally unacceptable 
beca use of the collateral effec ts. This wo uld violate the intergenerational principle 
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of conservation of opti ons, The chapter concludes th at' viable options ex ist to reduce 
greenhouse gas emiss ions, which would preclude th e need to threaten t'he interests 
of future genera tions, 
In C hapter 10 "Ocean Iron Fertilization: Science, Law, and Uncertainty," Randall 
Abate adds his vo ice to the discuss ion of OfF'. However, in contrast to Chapter ll , the 
author exp resses considerable skepti cism about, th e potential effec tiveness of OIF's 
ability enhance the oceanic sink for ca rbon dioxide through the addition of iron to 
stimulate phyt'Oplankton growth , as well as our capability of meeting th e substantia l 
monitoring and verificabon chal lenges, In addition to exa mining the role that exist-
ing international regimes could play in the regulation ofOlF, Abate addresses poten-
tially applicable domeshc laws in the United States (i, e" the Marine Protection, 
Research and Sanctuaries Ac t and t'he Na tional Environmental Policy Ac t) , The 
chapter concludes with detailed recommendations for establishing "an effective 
international law framework to regulat'e OW," Abate outlines two broad options in 
this contex t. The first is th e esta blishment' of an independent regime to address 
geoengineer ing, Such a regime could be patterned on the UN Environmental 
Modification Convention, Alternatively, geoengineering resea rch in particular 
could be regulated under a new internat'ionall"!'ea ty regime, or a less-formal interna-
tional resea rch consorl'ia, A second option would be to harmonize existing treaties, 
with the Internabonal Maritime Organiza tion serving as th e implementing boely 
given its oversight of several relevant regimes, including t'he London Convention 
and th e London Protocol. At th e domestic level in the United States, Abate also 
suggests coordination of federal responses, including t'he possibility of establishing 
a working group, 
In Chapter ll , "Ocean Iron Fertilizal'ion: Time to Lift t'he Research Taboo," 
Kirsten G lissow, Andreas Oschlies, Alexander Proelss, KatTin Rehdanz, and Wi lfri ed 
Rickels make the case for pursuing research of OIF, Although concluding that OIF 
may have th e potential to sequester comparable amounts of carbon dioxide as for-
est sequestTation techniques, Hle authors ac knowl edge substantia l uncertainties 
that necessitate furth er research, The remainder of t'he chapter is devoted to legal 
issues related to potential deployment of an OIF approach, The authors set forth 
a framework that' could integra te OIF int'O th e Clean Development Mechanism 
of the Kyo to Prot'ocol and include a discuss ion of methods to account for penna-
nence and leakage, The chapter exa mines t'he applicability of international treaty 
regimes to OIF, including the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and t-he London Convention and London 
Protocol. The authors conclude that th e application of t'he precautionary principle, 
often invoked by those who oppose climate geoengineering beca use of their poten-
tial negative impac ts could cut- in fa vo r of 0 1 F deployment given the t'hrea t posed 
by unchecked climate change, 
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In C hapter 12, "Remaking the World 1'0 Save It: Applying U.S. Environmenta l 
Laws to Climate Engineering Projec ts," Tracy Hester exa mines the potential appli-
cabil ity of U.S. environmental laws to climate geoengineering re earch. Pertinent 
statutes cited by the auth or include th e National Weather Modification Policy 
Act of 1972, the Clean Air Act, th e Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, the Marine Prot'ection, the Research and Sanct'ua ries Ac t, and the NaHonal 
Environmental Policy Ac t. The chapter also examines t'l1 e pot'ential fo r judicial 
review of geoengincering via comm on law nuisance claims. Hcster concludcs by 
noting that the federa l government may need to begin drafting stra tegies and estab-
li shing standards for approval or rejection of projec ts, and t'hat spec ific agencies may 
wish to explore options to stop pro jects that pose cxcessive dangers or evoke strong 
public reac tions. 
